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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, financial policy in the Philippines has been pushed in the general 
direction of liberalization. The package of reforms included lifting restrictions on deposit and lending 
rates, lowering reserve requirements on deposit institutions, liberalizing branching regulations, and 
removing the segmentation of the financial markets by blurring the specialization of financial 
institutions that have arisen from banking regulations. The thrust of financial reform reflected the 
prevailing view that the efficiency of financial markets in the less developed countries (LDCs) was 
hampered by regulations of the type enumerated above as well as the uncertainty generated by a 
macroeconomic environment conducive to large public deficits and high inflation (McKinnon 1973). 
The macroeconomic regime and the financial sector regulations all contribute to make the acquisition 
of financial instruments less than attractive for economic agents. This argument that financial repression 
lies at the root of the inefficiency of LDC financial markets leads to the conclusion that a reversal of the 
policy regime will provide incentives for acquiring financial instruments. This increases the amount of 
savings as well as the efficiency of the allocation of loanable funds across various investment opportu­
nities.
At the same time, however, the agrarian economy in LDCs tend to be highly fragmented because 
of uncertainty and information asymmetries. Peasant agriculture is characterized by high risk, seasona- 
bility, sequential production phases, covariate yields and spatial dispersion (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 
1986) limiting the applicability of the neoclassical paradigm of perfect and complete markets. Instead 
of anonymous agents transacting in frictionless markets, the identity and bargaining power of each agent 
become crucial in determining gains from bilateral transactions. Information asymmetries put a 
premium on close monitoring and personal ties to avoid adverse-selection effects and minimize the 
problem of moral hazard. Prices in such a world do not convey all the necessary information. Hence, 
even in the absence of myopic and ill-designed regulations on LDC financial markets as well as a stable 
macroeconomic environment, the risk of agricultural production and cost of information alone tend to 
hinder the efficient functioning of capital markets. Unless these real factors are appreciably changed, 
then financial markets in LDCs will continue to be characterized by fragmentation and second-best 
efficiency.
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2In the Philippines, trade and exchange rate policies of the national government have also been 
biased against agricultural production and the export of agricultural products (Bautista, Power et al. 
1979; Bautista 1987). In responding to political pressure from urban consumers, government has tra­
ditionally opted to underprice agricultural commodities and further distort incentives to farm produc­
tion. These measures tax agricultural production. But less noted is the fact that these measures tend to 
reduce the flow of savings and investment in the rural sector and inhibit the growth of the rural financial 
system. This is because the demand for credit is a derived demand and rural saving is a function of 
agricultural incomes. Hence, policies that limit the growth of agricultural production and income also 
adversely affect the growth of the rural financial sector.
Table 1 shows the pattern of lending by the formal financial sector to agriculture over the past 
decade. If financial liberalization were presumed to be the panacea, then the potion certainly did not 
seem to have led to a rejuvenation. In fact, the ratio of formal sector lending to agricultural gross value 
added (GVA) declined over time.1
Factors hindering the development of an efficient rural financial sector may be grouped under 
four main categories — (i) regulations that serve as barriers to competition among financial institutions, 
(ii) an unstable macroeconomic environment characterized by high and variable inflation rates, (iii) 
trade and exchange rate policies that bias incentives against agriculture and (iv) high risk of agricultural 
production and information asymmetries that characterize agrarian economies. Policy should then be 
pushed in a direction that alleviate the problems generated by these factors. The thrust of financial 
liberalization is to address factors (i) and (ii). Trade liberalization and the setting of a "realistic” 
exchange rate should help correct factor (iii). Investment in social and physical infrastructure and 
possibly land reform will lessen the burden posed by (iv).
The foregoing analysis suggests that first-best policies require less government intrusion in 
financial markets, getting prices right and the provision of public goods. To a large extent, this reflects 
the view that the government as an economic actor, should specialize in precisely those activities it 
enjoys comparative advantage, i.e. production and provision of public goods. Note that the provision 
of public goods means much more than the building of roads or bridges. To the extent that a peaceful, 
orderly and equitable society is a public good, then the role of government extends beyond satisfying 
the needs of economic man.2
1. This proposition is too dismissing of the potency of policies that attempt to end financial repression. In the first place, 
although financial liberalization has been amajor thrust of thepublic sector in the last decade, this was not accompanied by a stabilization 
of the macroeconomic environment. Indeed, the 1980s were punctuated by severe international and domestic shocks to the macroecon- 
omy. It saw the worst balance- of-payments crisis and recession in Philippine post-war history.
The downward trend in the ratio of the lending to agricultural GVA may reflect the winding down of many subsidized lending 
policies initiated by government and channeled through the formal banking sector. In this case, although the magnitude of financial 
flows has declined one can argue the allocation of any given amount of lending will have improved due to financial liberalization,
2. The idea that a more equitable distribution of income represents a public good arises if it is assumed economic agents are 
altruistic ( Hochman and Rogers 1969), i.e., utility is a function of own and other's incomes.
3Table 1
RATIO OF LOANS GRANTED TO GROSS VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE, 1980*1989
(In percent)
Year Crops Livestock Fishery Forestry
1980 42.7 37.6 9.0 23.8
1981 44.1 38.5 11.9 34.3
1982 38.9 39.6 12.3 32.2
1983 39.7 34.3 14.2 25.6
1984 22.7 18.7 7.2 16.0
1985 18.3 9.7 4.7 16.9
1986 21.5 9.5 7.7 11.0
1987 22.3 8.6 7.4 12.8
1988 18.4 10.9 12.5 12.8
1989 16.0 11.6 9.5 112
Sourc
4The declining role of the formal financial system in the provision of credit to Philippine 
agriculture is of major concern to policymakers, given the strategic role of agriculture. The agricultural 
sector is the employer of nearly half of the labor force3 and provider of income for nearly two-thirds of 
the population (Department of Agriculture. 1990). In the past, the government response to this 
imbalance in financing coming from the formal sector was subsidized credit. The massive failure of 
rural banks and the high default rates encountered in the supervised credit programs suggest the 
inefficiency and the unsustainability of these types of policy. Only a very small proportion of small 
farmers was reached by these programs and they failed to sustain credit support on a long-term basis 
(Technical Boarcf for Agricultural Credit. 1985). At the same time, a significant part of the subsidy 
implicit in these programs was captured by big rather than small farmers (Esguerra 1981).
On the other hand, most small-scale farmers continued to obtain their financing from informal 
credit sources. In the absence of detailed information about the informal market, there is a wide range 
in the estimates of its size varying from a low 37 percent (Sacay et at. 1985) to a high 90 percent 
(Agricultural Credit Policy Council 1990) of total agricultural lending. Still these estimates suggest the 
informal sector has been a flexible and significant source of funding for many agricultural enterprises, 
specially small ones.
In light of these policy failures and apparent unwillingness of the formal financial system to 
increase the flow of credit to rural enterprises despite the significant liberalization of the financial en­
vironment, there is increasing interest in the informal financial sector. The issues range from assessing 
the efficiency of this sector to seeing how it interacts with the formal financial system and other 
institutions of the agrarian economy (the labor and land markets). How are problems of risk, moral 
hazard and adverse selection handled by borrowers and lenders? What is the structure of interest rates 
charged in these informal arrangements? Do they vary considerably and do they reflect the high cost 
of information and high risk premiums or are they monopoly rents?
One of the more fascinating aspects of financial relations in the rural economy is the prevalent 
interlinked transactions involving credit and labor arrangements, land use or marketing services. This 
practice of interlinking is found in large areas of South Asia. Its prevalence is observed in rural credit 
markets in the Philippines (Bautista and Magno 1990). There are indications interlinking is practiced 
widely in the urban sector. Many small enterprises in the urban areas have credit needs served not by 
large banks but agents who market their output or input suppliers.
Interlinking has been explained largely as a response to imperfections in the agrarian economy. 
These imperfections are caused by the existence of risk and information asymmetry. In this context, 
these contracts produce a gain in economic efficiency. The question of how this institution will survive 
a major land reform program that will cover a wide array of crops (sugar and coconut, being the more 
prominent ones) is important, given the promise (or threat) of agrarian reform in this country. There are 
no studies, historical or empirical, of the evolution of these types of contracts in countries that have 
undergone successful land reform programs. It is significant to explore the welfare implications of an
3. Employment in fishery and forestry is included.
5institutional shock like land reform in a setting where risk and information asymmetries are important 
and institutions (interlinked contracts) exist that attempt to reduce these types of frictions.
The theoretical literature on interlinked credit contracts has been focused on tenancy cum credit 
contracts. Very few have dealt on other types of interlinked contracts, for example, marketing cum 
credit or land cum credit interlinking.4 This gap in the literature may prove important, given the 
historical experience of the rice sector subjected to land reform in this country. Both the green revolution 
and land reform shifted the source of informal credit from landowners to rice traders. Credit continues 
as part of an interlinked arrangement involving at the same time the conferment of marketing rights to 
the trader-creditor.
This review attempts to provide the background for a more detailed and rigorous examination, 
both theoretical and empirical, of the issue of agrarian reform and interlinking. In a sense, this issue can 
be interpreted as part of the larger question of institutional change in an agrarian setting. The peculiar 
environment of the agrarian economy produces a set of relationships and institutions. A subset of these 
institutions then will represent means of coping with certain forms of market imperfections. The process 
of economic development, whether engineered by the state or the private sector, will entail a 
fundamental alteration of this environment and the unraveling of some, if not most, of these institutions. 
The program of agrarian reform represents an important innovation that will alter the landscape of the 
rural sector. An understanding of this processs is necessary in order to reduce the costs of transition and 
adjustment. And it is in this light that the study on interlinked contracts should be seen.
This review contains five sections. The first section provides a capsule summary of the share 
tenancy literature while the second describes leading explanations of market interlinking. Section ID 
looks at interlinking of marketing and credit services while section IV deals with land market and credit 
interlocking. The last section discusses some of the welfare implications of various policy interventions, 
ranging from banning interlinked contracts to agrarian reform.
n . AN ANALYSIS OF SHARE TENANCY
Much of the theoretical literature on interlinked credit arrangements has been framed in terms 
of the relationship between landlord and tenant. This makes it difficult to provide a satisfactory survey 
of the field without delving into the literature on share-tenancy. Hence, this chapter starts by presenting 
some of the basic issues in this area. For a recent and comprehensive survey of the field, the reader is 
referred to Otsuka and Hayami (1988) and Hayami and Otsuka (1991).
4. The major exceptions are Floro (1987), Geron(1989) and Flora and Yotopoulos(1991).
6The standard argument against share tenancy centers on the weakening of work incentives that 
arises since the tenant receives only a share of the marginal product of his effort. This analysis dates back 
to Alfred Marshall (1890) and can be formally stated in the following way. Let U (e,c) be the utility 
function of the tenant where e is the level of work effort and c is the consumption of the tenant. Assume 
his consumption level is just his share of the output c =*>Cf(e), where f(e) is the production function and 
oCthe tenant’s share of the harvest. Maximizing U (e,c) with respect to effort leads to the first-order 
condition:
(1.1) - U / U  = tff(e )
Here, Ue is the marginal utility of effort, Uc the marginal utility of consumption and f ’(e) is the marginal 
product of the tenant’s effort. Hence, the tenant sets the marginal rate of substitution between effort and 
consumption equal to a share of his marginal product. Given that Uee < 0, this means the effort exerted 
by the tenant is lower than in a situation where CC = 1.
Cheung (1969) considers the case where the optimal level of work effort can be enforced by the 
landlord (Figure 1). The level of effort is measured along the horizontal axis and output and 
consumption along the vertical axis. The curve f(e) is the production function while U* is the 
indifference curve that assures the tenant his reservation utility level. The curve^f(e), on the other hand, 
is the share of output that goes to the tenant. The pareto-efficient allocation of effort is given by e*. This 
occurs at the level of effort where the vertical distance between the production function and the 
indifference curve U’ is maximum. An alternative characterization of the first-best allocation is that the 
tenant’s marginal rate of substitution between effort and consumption be equal to the marginal product 
of effort. In other words, e* is the solution to equation (1) when oa = 1. If the level of effort cannot be 
enforced, then the tenant will shirk and supply only the level of effort eA. This is where his indifference 
curve is tangent to his opportunity curve. However, assuming the effort level e’ can be enforced by the 
landlord, then the share contract will achieve the same level of resource efficiency. Note at e \  the 
tenant’s indifference curve is not tangent to his opportunity curve (<*f(e)). Hence he will like to shirk 
and offer less effort. However, assuming perfect enforcement of work effort, this is not possible for him. 
But Cheung’s assumption and analysis also mean that a fixed-wage and a fixed rent contract will yield 
the same first-best outcome and other considerations have to be provided to explain why share tenancy 
is chosen relative to other types of contracts. In Figure 1, for instance, the fixed-wage contract is given 
by the horizontal line WW which cuts IT at the same effort level e*. The fixed-rent contract is given by 
the curve f(e)-G, where 6 is the fixed amount of rent turned over to the landlord. Again, if effort can be 
enforced, then it achieves the same resource allocation as the share or fixed-wage contracts.
Cheung suggests that in the presence of uncertainty share tenancy allows a sharing of risk between 
landlord and tenant and provides an added dimension to the choice between share, fixed-wage or fixed- 
rent contracts. He assumes a higher transaction cost for negotiating a share contract than for either a 
fixed-wage or fixed-rent arrangement. But a fixed-wage labor contract requires the landlord to absorb 
all the risk of agricultural production. A fixed-rent leasehold, on the other hand, forces the tenant to bear 
all the risk of production. Hence, if both tenant and landlord are risk averse, then a share contract will 
allow an optimal sharing of risk between them and will be chosen if the benefits from the division of risk 
outweigh the higher transaction cost of negotiating a share contract.
Figure 1
EFFORT LEVELS WITH PERFECT ENFORCEMENT
However, this division of risk between landlord and tenant can be attained by a mix of fixed-rent 
and fixed-wage contracts on the assumption that work effort is perfectly enforceable. This result is 
illustrated in Figure 2 which is adopted from Hirshleifer and Riley (1979). Assume two possible states 
of nature: a good state (g) and a bad state (b). The dimension of the box in Figure 2 shows the 
corresponding harvest, if either state arises. O, (Ot) is the origin for the landlord (tenant). U* is the 
reservation utility level for the tenant. The line OtA is the certain income line for the landlord which 
corresponds to the fixed rent contract H ie line OtB is the certain income line for the tenant which 
corresponds in turn to the fixed-wage contract The diagonal line OtO, corresponds to the pure share 
tenancy contract To determine the share parameter of the tenant (e£) of a contract like point E, the ratio 
OtE/OtO, is taken. Hence the midpoint M corresponds toflC = 0.5. Any point within the area bounded 
by the lines 0 (B and 0,A  and not on the main diagonal represents a linear contract of the form B +<£f(e). 
B is positive (negative) if  the point lies below (above) the main diagonal. B > 0 implies a wage cum share 
tenancy contract while B < 0 is a fixed rent cum share tenancy contract. If the landlord is risk-neutral 
and the tenant risk-averse, the pareto-optimal outcome requires the landlord to absorb all the risk. In this 
case, only the wage contract will be chosen. If it is the other way around, the fixed-rent contract will 
be chosen. Now, if both landlord and tenant are risk-averse, then the optimal contract will be a (linear) 
share contract. This optimum is found where the contract curve intersects the reservation indifference 
curve U* (at point E’). Note the pure share contract will be chosen only under the most exceptional of 
coincidences, i. e. only under the most exceptional of circumstances will the indifference curve U* cut 
the contract curve along the diagonal.
However, this allocation of risk can be attained by a combined fixed-rent and fixed-wage 
contracts. The proof outlined below is essentially due to Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) and requires only 
the assumption of constant returns to scale. An alternative proof due to Allen (1984) drops even this 
assumption. The interested reader is referred to it. Let the landlord divide his fixed plot so that the 
proportioned is rented out at a fixed rental R to his tenant and the remainder ( l-« ’) is cultivated by the 
same tenant at the wage rate W. Let H be the size of the landlord’s plot and assume the total amount of 
effort is contractually set at e = 1. Remember the case being considered assumes costless monitoring 
and enforcement of labor effort. Assume the production function F (H, 1) exhibits constant returns to 
scale. Now, consider a share tenancy contract of the form 8’ +&’F (H, 1). The landlord receives -B’ + 
(l-(t’)F (H, 1). Now, set R such that R = [(l-Cfr’)W-B’yfcC’H]. Then the tenant’s income is:
[F(ot’H ,ct’)-cC’RH] + (l- tt’)W = F(o6’H,oC’) =cc’ F(H, 1) + B’
The landlord’s income is equal to:
cft’RH + [F((1-<*’)H, (1-oc’)) - ( l- tt’)W] = F((l-«t’)H, (l-<t’)) - B’
= (1-*’) F (H, 1) - B’
Hence, this alternative mixing of pure-rental and pure-wage contracts replicates the outcome and the 
distribution of risk produced by the share contract. In a world where labor effort is fully enforceable, 
the introduction of uncertainty does not solve the puzzle why share tenancy contracts are chosen over 
fixed-wage or fixed-rental contracts.
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This has led Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) to argue share tenancy contracts should be seen as an 
institution trying to carry out two functions simultaneously: to allocate risk between tenant and landlord 
and to provide work incentives for tenants in a situation where effort is costly to monitor. They argue 
it is difficult to explain the existence of share tenancy contracts unless risk-sharing and work incentive 
features are recognized. If the only problem is that effort is costly to monitor, then there will only be 
fixed rent tenancy contracts observed. This is because under fixed-rent tenancy, the tenant is rewarded 
the full marginal product of his effort. Also if the only problem is risk sharing, then assuming tenants 
are risk-averse and landlords risk-neutral there will only be fixed wage labor contracts observed. 
Furthermore, a mixture of pure rent and pure wage contracts can replicate any risk-sharing property of 
a share tenancy contract. Adopting a share tenancy contract should then be interpreted as an attempt 
to balance these two considerations. Asoc goes to one, the tenant’s work incentives are increased but he 
bears a higher share of the risk of production. As ocgoes to zero, the tenant’s work incentives become 
dull but he bears less of the production risk. A share tenancy contract produces some sharing of the 
production risk while simultaneously providing the tenant with enough incentive to provide effort
H I. M ODELLING INTERLOCKING CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS
The discussion of interlinking starts with the surplus extraction argument which sees 
interlinking as another instrument by which the landlord appropriates rent from his tenant. This is 
followed by an explanation of interlinking as a device to avoid the consequences of crop share 
restrictions. Third is the credit market imperfection explanation which sees interlinking as a spillover 
of credit-rationing in the formal financial sector. Next is an explanation of the models of interlinking 
credit and tenancy contracts where interlinking is seen as an attempt to deal with the dual problem of 
moral hazard and risk diversification left unresolved by the tenancy contract. Finally, the view of 
interlinking as a mechanism for screening is taken up.
A. Interlinking as Surplus Extraction
The idea that interlinking provides the landlord a way of extracting a higher rate of monopoly 
rent from his tenant was first broached by Bhaduri (1973 and 1977). The presumption of the Bhaduri 
model is that the landlord’s social standing arises from his property right to land and usury. Because he 
usually owns no property, the tenant is rationed out of the modem capital market. However, his tenancy 
contract can serve as collateral to his landlord who then becomes the main source of credit. The 
stationary equilibrium in Bhaduri’s model is then characterized by perpetual indebtedness of the tenant 
His share of the crop is just enough for his consumption requirement and paying off the interest on his 
debt. It is, however, insufficient to pay off the principal. He assumes the landlord likes to preserve these 
two modes of exploitation and will resist adopting new technologies that increase output to an extent 
allowing the tenant to avoid this cycle of indebtedness.
One of the problems with the model is that it does not explicitly depict the interaction between 
the sharing ratio and the provision of credit (size of loan and the interest rate). Why is the landlord unable 
to maximize his income just by altering the share ratio, given his presumed monopoly power in the 
village? The issue can be framed more precisely in the following fashion. Imagine a village where 
landlords require tenants to borrow from them at a real interest rate higher than the alternative source
11
(the village moneylender). LetoCbe the current sharing ratio. Now suppose one landlord decides to untie 
his credit cum tenancy contract. He can keep his tenant at the same utility level as the other tenants in 
the village by requiring a higher share#’ (whereot’">d?) for himself. The tenant will surrender a higher 
share of output to the landlord but will in return be able to obtain credit at a lower cost from the village 
moneylender. In equilibrium, the linked and unlinked contracts should result in the same welfare levels 
for the tenants in the village.
This analysis suggests the importance of analyzing the moneylending activities of landlords in 
the framework of the entire tenancy arrangement. In this view, there is nothing the provision of credit 
can add to the appropriation of surplus from the tenant that cannot be achieved by simply altering the 
share received by the landlord.
However, if labor is heterogeneous, a monopolist-landlord will be able to extract larger profits 
from tenants with an interlinked contract (see Braverman and Guasch 1984). The intuition for this is 
that the interlinked contract functions as a screening device that allows the monopolist-landlord to dis­
criminate among high- and low-productivity tenants.
B. Interlinking and Legal Restrictions on Crop Shares
Braverman-Srinivasan (1981) emphasizes the role of legal restrictions on crop shares in the 
origin of interlinking. Two important arguments in the Braverman-Srinivasan paper involve a refutation 
of the idea that interlinkage represents an additional instrument for surplus extraction and explain the 
existence of interlinkage as a response to a legal floor on the tenant’s crop share.
Credit interlinkage is considered a redundant instrument for surplus extraction because the 
landlord can achieve the same effect simply by altering the size of the tenant’s land. Suppose agricultural
workers have two employment alternatives: work as casual laborers and earn the utility level U* or
accept a share tenancy contract. Under profit maximization by landlords, the equilibrium will be char­
acterized by each tenant being pushed to the reservation utility level U*. This occurs simply with the 
landlord reducing the size of the plot assigned to each tenant. With a reduction in plot size the tenant 
must increase his work effort just to maintain his current production (consumption) level. Hence, the 
same output level can be generated from a smaller piece of land. There is, therefore, an incentive for 
the landlord to decrease plot size since his income is a decreasing function of plot size. So if in the initial 
tenancy contract the tenant’s utility is greater than U*, the landlord merely changes the terms of the 
contract so that a smaller plot size is assigned to the tenant. He decreases plot size until the tenant’s utility 
is equal to U* where a further alteration of plot size will drive the tenant away to the casual labor market.
The formal argument can be presented in the following way. Consider a tenant with a utility 
function (U(c,e)) that depends positively on current consumption (c) and negatively on his effort (e). 
Assume U(c,e) is a strictly quasiconcave function and the following restrictions also apply:
(1.2) U U - U U  >0,  U U - U U  < 0v '  e ce c ec 7 e ec e ec
Here Uc, Ue, Ucc, Uce, Uce, and Uec are the partial first and second derivatives of the arguments c and e, 
respectively. We assume naturally that Ucc and Uee are both strictly negative. By Young’s theorem, Ucc
12
= Uk: The restrictions in (1.2) ensure consumption and leisure (which is defined as - e) are normal goods. 
Note that this implies that Uk = Uec < 0.
Let the tenant obtain the share cC of his total output with the landlord getting the rest. Let the 
production function F(e, H) be linearly homogeneous in e and H where H is the size of the tenant’s plot 
in hectares. Dividing through by H and letting 1 = 1/H, total output can be written as f(el)/l. Assume 
f’ > 0 and f ”  < 0 . Note an increase (decrease) in plot size is represented by a decline (increase) in 1.
Assume at the beginning of the period the tenant borrows his consumption for the duration and 
pays off the loan after output is realized at the period’s end. He can borrow from the village moneylender 
at the interest rate ra or from his landlord at the rate rt. Let v be the portion of his total borrowing from 
his landlord. Then, his consumption will be given by:
(1.3) c =flCf(el) /  l[l+vrt+ (l-v )rj = 6 f(el)/l
where B = [1 + vrt + ( l-v )r j  is the tenant’s discounted share of output.
The tenant’s problem is thus:
(1.4) Maxe U(8 f(el)/l, e)
subject to U = U*. The first-order condition is given by:
(1.5) Ucf ’ B + U = 0
The landlord’s revenues per tenant is given by:
(1.6) R = (l-cC)f(el)/l + v(r-p)B f(el)/l 
This can be rewritten as:
(1.6') R = {l-B[l+vp+(l-v)rJ}f(el)/l
Here p is the landlord’s cost of capital assumed different from ra. In principle, the landlord’s problem 
is to maximize (1.6) by choosingeC, v, r and 1 subject to keeping the tenant at the reservation utility level. 
But only the effect of a change in 1 on optimal e is needed to be examined.
Now z = el is effort per hectare of land. Note R is an increasing function of z. Hence so long 
as dz/dl > 0, the landlord will have an incentive to reduce plot size. Totally differentiate the first-order 
condition (1.5) to get:
dz/dl = [(Bf/lU )(U cU -U U > (z / lU  )(U eU - U  U e)] D > 0
where D = U Blf” + [ ( U 2U -2U U U + U U 2) / U 21 <0.
cc LV e cc c«f e c ee c 7  c J
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Hence, we conclude that in equilibrium, tenancy contracts will be characterized by utility equivalence, 
i. e. all tenants pushed to the reservation utility level U*.
The second important result of Braverman-Srinivasan is that the landlord will interlink the 
tenancy and credit contracts if there is a floor on the crop share of the tenant. This will be the landlord’s 
attempt at recovering the share of output that has been transferred to the tenant by law. The interlinked 
contract will involve charging a very high rate of interest for rather small loans. The formal argument 
goes something like this.
Let there be an initial equilibrium in which no linking takes place (v=0). The landlord’s income 
is given by: Y* = (1-B*0*)f(ex) = (l-°Of(ex), since B* =flt*/(l+ra) and B* = l+ ra. HerecC is the initial crop 
share and ra is the cost of credit from the alternative source. Now suppose a legal floor on the tenant’s 
crop share (ot) is imposed where<£* >$r The landlord can get arbitrarily close to his previous income 
Y* by interlocking credit and tenancy contracts. This can be seen by considering the following sequence 
of tenancy cum credit contracts:e£n =oC , r = n, vn = [(Af-®tf)(l+ra)]/n<»\ This implies the sequences Bn -  
cC/[l+vnn+(l-vn)ra] and0ni = l+v^+ C l-vJr^ So as n ->c*,ccn ->oCr r( ~>co, vn --> 0, vnn --> [<bef- 
aO (l+ ra)]yfcc\ Hence, Bn - > « /{  1+r+[fcf-as')(l+r>)]Ae‘} = «7(l+ r,) = B* and 0 - >  l+ ra. Hence 1-Bn0n
- >  1 -«e*.
Note the interest rate on the interlinked credit becomes arbitrarily large while the size of 
interlinked credit goes to zero. If the legal restriction does not exist, there is no incentive for interlinking 
since the landlord has essentially a redundancy of instruments for realizing his maximization objective.
C. Interlinking and Credit Market Imperfections
Basu (1983) attributes the existence of credit interlinking to credit market imperfections. Inter­
linking provides a device for lowering the risk of strategic default. Basu assumes the labor contract 
chosen is a pure wage contract and effort can be fully enforced by the landlord so that the incentive 
problem does not exist. In his model, employers are the main source of informal lending. Potential risk 
in the credit market exists because lenders are unable to ensure repayment of a loan unless the borrowers 
are their own employees. This leads to what Basu terms ‘isolation’, a situation of a fragmented credit 
market with borrowing and lending taking place primarily between the employer and his employees.
Although a sole supplier of credit in this isolated market, the employer takes as parametric his 
employee’s reservation utility level U*. The employee’s indirect utility function has the wage rate w 
and the loan rate i as arguments. His utility is increasing in w and decreasing in i. The employer’s income 
comes from his farm’s output and interest revenues. His costs are the cost of labor as well as the 
alternative cost of his funds.
Isolation can lead to interlinking of credit and wage contracts even without any imperfection in 
the labor market. To see this, assume w* is the given market wage rate. Let L(i) be the demand for loans 
by the employee and i* be such that L(i*) = 0. Suppose U*, the reservation utility level satisfies: U(w*, 
i*) = u * . That is, the reservation utility level is equal to utility of the employee if he accepted a wage 
offer w* without being able to acquire credit. Think of the pair (w*, i*) as an unlinked wage-credit 
contract. Now so long as dU(w*, i*)/dw* > 0 and dU(w*, i*)/di* < 0, then there are linked contracts
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(w, i) with w < w* and i < i* such that the employee will be indifferent between the linked and the 
unlinked contracts. The employer will be willing to offer a loan at a rate i below i* if the wage rate is 
sufficiently lowered below w*. Reducing i below i* lowers the wage component of the employer’s cost 
per worker by dw/di. However, his interest cost per employee goes up by L(i) + i dL(i)/di. Hence so 
long as dw/di > L{i) + idL(i)/di, then the employer will find it advantageous to continue reducing the 
interest rate since wage costs fall more than the rise in interest costs. Hence, it will be possible to observe 
situations in which workers receive less than w* though no imperfections exist in the labor market. The 
important point about Basu’s explanation of interlinking is that it suggests that linked markets are 
competitive, even though taken individually they may not appear to be so.
D. Interlinking and Moral Hazard
Share tenancy is thought to balance the provision of work incentives with risk-sharing. Although 
pushing?# to one will improve resource allocation, the resulting increase in risk borne by the tenant might 
be so high this would be untenable. The imperfect work incentives provided by share tenancy contracts 
is compensated for by the welfare gains arising from risk-sharing. This means that a mechanism which 
increases work incentives while holding the allocation of risk constant will benefit the landlord. 
Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1984) argue that interlinking might be a way for the landlord 
to minimize shirking by his tenants.
The principal-agent problem arises in a situation when the principal cannot completely specify 
the agent’s actions but at the same time the agent’s actions have an important bearing on the principal’s 
welfare. In case of share tenancy, the tenant’s incentive to exert effort is diluted since he obtains only 
a share of his marginal product. Furthermore, the tenant usually has significant discretion in actions 
taken on the farm. Hence to a large extent, it will be costly for the landlord to completely monitor the 
tenant’s effort and enforce the pattern of behavior the landlord feels is desirable. If the output of the 
tenant is also affected by the vagaries of weather and pests, the landlord cannot directly infer the amount 
of effort based on realized output. This leads to a situation in which the landlord has an incentive to 
induce more effort from the tenant. This inducement mechanism may be provided by linking the 
provision of credit with the tenancy arrangement. Note the argument for interlinking provided by 
Braverman-Stiglitz depends only on the existence of a moral hazard problem and envisions no 
imperfection in the capital market as does Braverman-Srinivasan. That is, so long as greater 
indebtedness by the tenant induces more effort, the landlord will find it worthwhile to tie credit with the 
tenancy contract.
Braverman and Stiglitz’s (1982) model is helpful in illustrating some of these ideas. Assume the 
size of plot is fixed at 1 = 1. Next, introduce uncertainty by making output subject to the vagaries of 
weather or technology shocks. Hence, realized output can be written as f(e)g, where g is the output shock 
with mean and variance normalized to unity. Finally, assume the tenant has borrowed an amount B at 
the start of the period and needs to repay B(1 +r) at the period’s end.
The tenant’s maximization problem is then: Max e E[U(cCf(e)g - B(l+r),e)]. The first-order 
condition for effort is:
(1.7) 0CE[Uc f ’g]+E[UJ = 0
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Totally differentiate (1.7) with respect to e and B to get:
de/dB = E (U cO!fg)/E(U +E UcoCf” g+2 EU ^tff’g +E U J<tf’ g)2] > 0
An increment in the indebtedness of the tenant increases his effort. Note this result depends only on the 
assumption consumption and leisure are normal goods (equation (1.2)).
Now consider the design of an optimal tenancy contract between the landlord and the tenant 
where the landlord offers credit B in the initial period and demands a repayment of B ’ at the end of the 
period. The implicit interest rate charged by the landlord can be a function of the size of the tenant’s 
borrowing. Assume both the landlord and tenant can borrow at the same rate p from the capital market. 
Braverman-Stiglitz shows that since de/dB > 0, profit-maximizing behavior by the landlord will lead 
him to tie credit with the tenancy contract so that he subsidizes the tenant. The proof is relatively 
straightforward.
The landlord’s problem is to maximize:
(1.8) Y = (l-fiCjf(e) + (r-p)B 
subject to the reservation utility of the tenant.
(1.9) E U[B, e,oCf(e)-(l+r)B] = U*
The solution to this problem entails setting [(dY/dB)/dY/dBA)] = [(dU/dB)/(dU/dBA)], i. e. setting the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the landlord equal to the MRS of the tenant. But the MRS of the 
tenant is equal to:
l/[(l-0f)f’(e)de/dBA + 1], Hence in equilibrium:
(1.10) U ’(c0)/E U ’(c,.e) = (1+p)/[( 1 -ec)f’(e)de/dBA + 1]
In a perfectly competitive capital market, the MRS between present and future consumption should 
equal one plus the real interest rate.
(1.11) U ’(c0)AJ’(c,) = 1 + p
Comparing (1.10) with (1.11), this means that the landlord finds it optimal to lower the real cost of 
borrowing for the tenant to induce him to go into greater debt.
E. Interlinking and Risk
While Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1984) focus on the work-incentive effects of 
interlinked credit arrangements, Kotwal (1985) emphasizes the risk-sharing effects. Given a particular 
share contract with its associated set of work incentives and risk sharing features, is there a mechanism 
for further attenuating the risk faced by the tenant? In his view, the provision of credit by the landlord 
is a state-contingent side payment to minimize fluctuations in the tenant’s income. The landlord extends
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financing during bad harvests while demanding repayment during unusually good periods. This 
explanation is consistent with the observed frequency of roll-overs of loans and the accumulation of 
large debts by tenants with little chance of being repaid.
The argument can be put in the following way. Let y = f(e) + $ be aggregate production with 
0 representing the weather shock to output. Assume 8 has mean zero and variance equal to var ($). 
Assume that we have a linear tenancy contract of the form: >"= B -me y = B +ccf(e) +&Q, whereT  is the 
income of the tenant. The variance of the tenant’s income is var (yl = « 2 var(0). Now consider the 
following alternative contract: r ’ = B’ +OP’[y-f(e*;0)A]. Here, f(e*;0)A represents the landlord’s best 
guess of the output level, if effort is set at the optimum level e*, given the state of the weather. In other 
words, f(e*;0)A = f(e*) + 9 + S. Here, ^ is  the estimation error with mean zero and variance equal to var
Cfi).
An interpretation of the contract r ’ goes something like this. The landlord attempts to 
compensate for fluctuations in the tenant ’ s income from the share contract by demanding a side payment 
during good years and handing it out during bad years. Weather-caused fluctuations in the tenant’s 
income arise from the behavior of the term 9. During good (bad) years, 9 is positive (negative) and so 
output is high (low). Hence, the alternative contract introduces the compensating mechanism - 
<$’f(e*;e)A = -cC’[f(e*) + 0 +8 ] that reverses the impact of 0. During good years (a positive value of 9), 
the amount -dt’0 is added to the tenant’s income, while during bad years (a negative value of 8), the 
amount-<&'9 is added to the tenant’s income. Note the state-contingent side-payment -CP’0 behaves much 
like the flow of financing between tenant and landlord. During hard times, when tenants are expected 
to ask their landlord for loans, the side payment -#’$ is positive. During good times, when tenants are 
anticipated to want to pay back their loans, the side payment -ot'8 is negative.
Now, write the alternative contract as: >*’ = 8 ’ -t-oc’ [f(e)-f(e=fc)]-a:’^5‘. Setct’ =o& and B’ = B +dC’f(e*) 
so th a t f ’ = B +CCf(e) -H£f. The variance of v '  is var (*-’) =0t2 var(<J\ Hence if the error of estimation 
S has a smaller variance than the shock variable^, i. e. var ($) < var (tf), then the alternative contract r ’ 
pareto-dominates the first contract. This is because both contracts give the same expected income to the 
tenant but contract T’ is less risky than y. A share contract with state-contingent side payments pareto- 
dominates a share-tenancy contract without side payments. This proof, however, requires that f(e*) be 
known. Kotwal’s explanation suggests one need not appeal to capital-market imperfections or any moral 
hazard problem to explain interlinked credit arrangements. The fundamental explanation lies in the 
inefficiency of share tenancy as instrument to dissipate risk.
F. Interlinking As a Screening Device
Braverman and Guasch (1984) provide another rationale for credit and tenancy interlinking. 
Suppose that the available pool of labor differs in ability. A worker of type i, assigned to a fixed plot 
of land, is assumed to provide a particular grade of labor e(i). Each worker must also work with some 
capital with the more able workers generating a higher marginal product of capital. Now let us further 
assume that wdrkers are observationally indistinguishable. Then landlords will have an incentive to 
develop screening mechanisms to sort out the different grades of workers. They want to acquire the 
higher grade of workers as tenants to make capital more productive and generate a higher level of output. 
The interlinking of credit and tenancy contract can be a screening device.
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Landlords offer each prospective tenant i (1) a share-tenancy contract with a fixed share oc 
(determined by convention or by law) and (2) credit b(i) at the the tenant. The idea is that the interlinked 
contract forces self-selection among the workers with the more able workers choosing contracts offering 
a higher level of credit (and hence capital). This is because they have the higher marginal product of 
capital. Now, the workers maximize a utility function U.[b(i),r(i)] subject to a reservation utility level 
of at least U*, as the level of welfare from unattached labor.
Let 11 [b(i),r(i)] be the landlord’s income from the interlinked contract. The landlords behave as 
monopolistic competitors. In equilibrium each one will be attached to a particular grade of labor but the 
profit of the landlords form any given contract will be the same. In particular, let the workers indexed 
n be the lowest grade of labor that end up as share tenants. Their utility must equal the reservation level 
U* and let U* be the level of profits of the landlords who employ them. Then in equilibrium, all landlords 
earn the amount H*.
The equilibrium in this model turns out to be a sorting equilibrium.5 In this sorting equilibrium, 
the more able tenants choose to borrow a greater amount of capital. With a higher marginal product of 
capital, they should produce more output than less able tenants. Since the equilibrium is characterized 
by equality of profits among landlords, the employers of the more able must tenants must offer a lower 
interest rate to their tenants. Hence in equilibrium, the loan-interest rate schedule is downward sloping.
It is not clear whether the sorting equilibrium produced by the interlinking is a pareto-efficient, 
since the capital chosen by each grade of labor cannot be less than in the first-best world (where each 
grade of labor is distinguishable). Hence, the screening might induce a substantial overinvestment in 
capital by each grade of labor to distinguish it from lower grades.6 The departure from pareto efficiency 
obviously depends on how close the different labor types are.
IV. PRODUCT AND CREDIT M ARKET INTERLINKING
The linking of credit and product marketing contracts has received far less attention than the 
linking of share tenancy and credit. At the same time, more consideration has been given to the latter 
case of interlinking in the Philippines where interest centers on rice and the peculiar mix of historical 
circumstances involving the “ green revolution”  and land reform.
Starting in the mid-1960s, a drive by the public sector in this country was initiated to encourage 
the widespread adoption of modern rice varieties. The advent of the green revolution yielded significant 
increases in rice production specially in Central Luzon. The result was a large amount of rice surplus
5. A sorting equilibrium can be defined as a set of contracts S(i)=(b(i), r(i)) such that:
(i) for I > n, U| [b(i).r(i)]>U|[b(j),r(j)]for all j;
(ii) for i=n,Ul[b(i)j(i)]=U*;
(iii) for i>n TT[b(i),r(i)]=T|*.
This means each category of labor, i, strictly prefers the contract i. Labor type n (the lowest grade of labor to get tenancy 
contract) gets the reservation utility level and landlords get the going rental rate on land.
6. This result is familiar from models o f signalling (Spence 1974).
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to move from farms to markets in urban areas. The demise of the traditional landlord-tenant relation- 
ship ruptured ties involving credit. A new set of ties has evolved in the meantime involving large traders 
requiring reliable and low-cost sources of rice as well as farmers with continuing needs for both 
financing and transporting output from farm to market.
In the extensive literature on tenancy and credit interlinking, the idea that the institution of share 
tenancy attempts to balance the problems of moral hazard and allocation of the risk of production 
provides a natural handle for explaining interlinking. Interlinking provides an added instrument for 
reducing moral hazard (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Mitra 1984) or achieving a better distribution of 
risk between landlord and tenant (Kotwal 1985). That natural handle is missing in the issue of why 
marketing and credit contracts are interlinked.
One of the first questions to ask is: do trader-lenders primarily employ credit interlinkages to 
facilitate trading activities (Geron 1989; FloroandYotopoulos 1991) or do they basically avail of output 
interlinking to lower risk of strategic default of borrowers (Bell 1990, Hoff and Stiglitz 1990, Siamwalla 
and associates 1990 and Udry 1990)? This question is central because it focuses on the exact informa­
tion and incentive problems being addressed by interlinking. If the latter is the case, then the entire issue 
of output-credit interlinking is best framed as a contractual mechanism that allows creditors to better 
screen borrowers, provides greater incentives for repayment and strengthens enforcement of repayment 
(Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). If the former is the case though, then interlinking can be explained as a 
mechanism the trader access to supply or smoothing fluctuations in the farmer-lender’s delivery of 
marketable surplus.
Udry ’ s paper (1990) is intriguing because of the absence of interlinked contracts in his study area 
in Nigeria. Given the seemingly ubiquitous nature of interlinking in less developed agrarian economies, 
it is a valuable piece of empirical work in that it leads to the consideration of conditions interlinking is 
unnecessary. He conjectures that its absence in this particular study area is due to lack of any significant 
moral hazard or adverse selection problem in the small, closely-knit community. About half of the 
variability in income is idiosyncratic with slightly more than half being accounted for by village-level 
shocks. Hence, borrowing and lending among members of the village, deemed as insurance against 
idiosyncratic risk, create substantial benefits.
Diversification of risk across communities is served by a class of merchants with long-term 
relations with other merchants across Nigeria. These traders may lend to local villagers but do not 
require interlinking because of familiarity with borrowers and local events. They may in turn obtain 
some of their credit from merchants outside the village with perhaps the long-term and historic nature 
of these trading ties serving to discourage a likely strategic default
On the other hand, Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) explain credit and output interlinking as profit- 
maximizing behavior by the trader-lender, without any explicit assumption about imperfections in 
credit or output markets. Their explanation for interlinking is that the lender’s profit rises by increasing 
his share of the trade in marketable surplus. The drawback of their model is that it solves a simple profit- 
maximization problem by the trader in which case the Kuhn-Tucker conditions only generate an offer 
curve for a bundled (interlinked) contract. It does not have a reciprocal offer curve from the borrower 
and hence the borrower’s incentives for accepting a bundled contract are unclear. The way that the profit
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maximization problem is set up, there are market prices for unlinked credit and marketing services. The 
existence of these prices deepen the puzzle why interlinking can achieve a pareto superior allocation over 
the competitive equilibrium (when contracts are unbundled).
There are at least two important incentives why the lender will accept a bundling of the contract 
-- if it manages to reduce his cost of marketing his own output and if he is credit-rationed. Hence, it 
should be assumed that the borrower is credit-rationed and that the price of unlinked credit observed 
is really the prevaling price in the formal sector of a “ dualistic”  financial system.
Geron (1989) suggests interlinking is desirable for the trader because it increases his command 
over marketable surplus and desirable for the farmer since it lowers marketing costs. This point is not 
developed any further though since her concern is more with characterizing the relationship between the 
price at which the trader will purchase the farmer’s product and the interest rate on the loan. Given that 
interlinked contracts exist, what is the expected relationship between price and interest rate and does this 
relationship vary with the nature of the borrower? Geron assumes two distinct motivations of borrowers: 
-consum ption (Type 1) and purchases of inputs (Type 2). With Type 1 borrowers, the lender encounters 
some moral hazard problem because the loan size (hence, the level of consumption) will affect the 
borrower’s optimal level of effort. This effect on effort is important to the lender because it will 
determine the output size the borrower can make available to the lender for marketing. Geron assumes 
lenders can distinguish between two types of borrowers. This distinction of borrower types seems a trifle 
arbitrary since it is unlikely lenders can adequately monitor the use of funds unless the lender provides 
credit in kind (fertilizer, pesticide, etc.). With significant monitoring costs, lenders will always face 
significant moral hazard problems in their lending decision.
It turns out the resulting iso-profit or indifference curves of either type of borrower is positively- 
sloped in the price (P) and interest (i) space. Profit-maximization by the trader-lender then requires him 
to choose that combination of i and P such that the marginal cost from decreasing i or increasing P just 
equals the marginal gain from increased effort induced from the farmer-borrower.
There is good reason to believe more research in credit and output interlinking will lead to more 
insights into motivations underlying these bundled contracts. It is likely that at the root of these bundled 
contracts lie the problems of asymmetric information successfully utilized to explain various aspects of 
agrarian economies. At the same time, current explanations of output-credit interlinking have not 
satisfactorily addressed the other role of the lender as trader or provider of marketing services. To what 
extent do production risk, the trader’s desire to gain access to a stable and adequate supply of marketable 
output, the cost of storage, and output price variability influence the desirability and terms of interlinked 
contracts, if at all? Framing some of the issues this way will yield a richer and more substantial data base 
on interlinked output and credit contracts.
V. LAND AND CRED IT INTERLOCKING
According to Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), the observed provision of credit by farmer-lenders 
involving the tying of usufruct rights on the land owned by borrowers constitutes interlinking. The 
bundling of these transactions is desirable to borrowers because they are credit-rationed by formal
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creditors or the village moneylender. On the other hand, the lender can, by appropriately choosing the 
borrower and the terms of the credit contract, influence the incidence of default. For the individual 
interested in increasing ownership o f land, this provides a cheaper way of acquiring more land.
If there are legal impediments restricting the current owners’ property rights to his land, then 
interlinking reflects the spillover of these obstacles to the credit market. More importantly, the existence 
of interlinking now need not require that the lender be able to induce a greater probability of default by 
borrower. The dilution of property rights to land acquired through land reform in the Philippines arises 
from the restriction on land transfers only to the direct heirs of the beneficiary. In a situation in which 
enforcement of these restrictions is far from perfect, the transfer of land rights to individuals other than 
heirs can still take place, although on a temporary rather than permanent basis. The partial effectiveness 
of the prohibition makes the appropriateness of the stream of rentals on land far down the future more 
uncertain than in the current period. For the farmer interested in acquiring more land to cultivate, a rental 
market might be better for him because he can hedge against the possibility of being caught in violation 
of the law. The owner of the land may in turn be credit-constrained in the formal financial sector because 
his land is insufficient collateral, given that rights to it cannot be transferred. The provision of credit 
rather than a pure rental agreement will be desirable to hedge against a future default.
Such an explanation is deemed more consistent with the evidence provided by Otsuka (1991) 
and Nagarajan and David (1990) regarding the increasingly prevalent practice of land pawning in 
Central Luzon. In these pawning arrangements, credit is provided to a borrower in exchange for 
temporary cultivation rights to the borrower’s property. According to Nagarajan and David, 42 percent 
of such contracts fall below two years in duration and about 70 percent of such contracts are made with 
relatives, business associates or friends. Cases of a permanent transfer of land rights apparently occurred 
infrequently.
Otsuka (1991) argues that compared to other South Asian countries, land reform under the 
Marcos government was relatively successful, especially in Central Luzon. For farmlands below seven 
hectares, share tenants were converted to leasehold tenants with amount of lease fixed under law. For 
farmlands exceeding seven hectares, excess land was transferred to current share tenants provided land 
titles acquired this way could only be transferred to legitimate heirs. This period also coincided with the 
spread of modern rice varieties (the “ green revolution” ) with returns to land planted to the modern 
varieties increasing substantially over time. A secular shift rightward of the market demand curve for 
rice lands was observed while the prohibition against resale of lands acquired under land reform limited 
the amount of land that could be transferred. Pawning emerged as a surrogate for a land market. Buyers 
(sellers) interested in acquiring (disposing of) temporary or even permanent land rights could transact 
in the surrogate market since the land market could not develop under the prohibition.
Land is a durable asset whose returns R(t) are spread out over time. Assume R(t) as output less 
payments to the variable factors of production, i. e., rent. Ownership of land then confers a right to 
appropriate those rents R(t). Let be the instantaneous discount rate and V(t) be the value (price) of 
land. If the function R(t) is known, then:
(4.1) V(t)= f “exp(-6s)R(s)ds
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That is, the market price of land is simply equal to the present value of the rental stream. Prohibitions 
on outright transfers of land held by land reform beneficiaries can be thought of as lying on a continuum 
of effectiveness. At one extreme, the enforcement can be so lax so that the land market is completely 
unaffected by the introduction of the legislation. In this case, the acquisition price of land continues to 
be given by (4.1) and the purchaser appropriates the discounted value of the entire stream R(t). At the 
other extreme, it is possible for such restrictions to be absolute such that the price of land is undefined 
since no market transaction takes place. The stream of rents is inappropriable by anyone other than the 
current beneficiary and his heirs. In between lies a region of varying degrees of success in enforcing the 
regulation. A natural way of thinking about what it means for the prohibition to become more effective 
is to imagine that the appropriability of future rents to anyone else becomes increasingly uncertain.
Let F(t) be the cumulative probability that the prohibition becomes binding at time t where F ’(t) 
is the corresponding probability density function. Assume this means that the individual gets caught 
violating the regulation, thus losing the rental stream beyond period t. Assume further there exists a T 
such that F(T) = 1. An increase in the effectiveness of the prohibition is seen as a decrease in the value 
of T. This reduces the duration that the purchases are able to appropriate the rents from the land. The 
expected purchase price is now:
(4.2) E[V(t)\ = /"[/"expt-Ss^JdslF'Cxyt 
Noting that F ’(t) = 0 for t > T  and integrating by parts lead to:
(4.3) E[V(t)\= f ' Texp(-Ss)Ji(s)[l -F'(s)]ds
The prohibition has two effects.7 First, the effect of the uncertainty is to effectively truncate the horizon 
in which the purchaser expects to enjoy the benefits of ownership from land. The result is the 
development of a surrogate land market where land is leased for a duration of T. A rental market arises 
as a way for agents to hedge the risk from being caught violating the prohibition. Short-term leases of 
land will be less risky than outright sales. Second, the prohibition results in a sharper discounting of the 
expected stream of earnings over that truncated horizon with the additional discount factor being l-F ’(t). 
The uncertainty associated with the legal prohibition results in undervaluation of the rental stream 
relative to what would have occurred in a situation where property rights are fully conferred upon land 
reform beneficiaries. This indicates that undervaluation of rental values need not be attributed solely 
to monopoly power exercised by lessees over lessors.
Credit rather than direct rental payments is viewed as a way of getting abound the legal restriction 
on the transfer of usufruct rights to land. The empirical evidence on land pawning is consistent with this 
view that cash advances provided by ‘ ‘lenders ’ ’ have the same character as payment for land leases. The 
observed interlinking is not a response to some technological feature of the rural landscape as is true in 
the share-tenancy with credit contract. In the latter, interlinking arises as a response to the problem of 
moral hazard. Legal restrictions on property rights provide the rationale for the development of a land 
lease market in which rental payments are then hidden in the guise of credit. This analysis suggests that
7. The result should be familiar from Yaari's (1965) classic article on uncertain lifetimes.
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although these restrictions on property rights to land may have a benevolent motivation (to prevent a 
resale to previous owners), they have the undesirable effect of devaluing the collateral value of land 
owned by the land reform beneficiaries. Ultimately, these restrictions make land reform beneficiaries 
poor credit risks from the point of view of formal financial institutions and undermine their access to 
these institutions.
VI. W ELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Given the various explanations advanced for credit interlinking, an assessment of the welfare 
impact of different types of policy interventions may now proceed. The policy prescriptions for 
evaluation are: banning of interlinking and land reform.
A. Banning Interlinking
Much of the interlinking literature view the bundling of contracts as a welfare-increasing 
institution. Certain quarters continue to have misgivings about the welfare effects of these bundled 
contracts (Floro and Yotopoulos 1991) but for the most part, they are viewed as increasing efficiency. 
In the moral hazard literature, the bundling minimizes shirking and shifts the allocation of effort closer 
to the pareto-efficient level. In the risk-reduction literature, the bundling of contracts lowers the risk of 
agricultural production for the risk-averse peasant and shifts the allocation of risk closer to the pareto- 
optimum (all the risks borne by the risk-neutral landlord and none by the tenant). In the credit market 
imperfection literature, the bundling allows pareto-improving trades in which a reduction in wage rates 
is compensated for by the availability of finance. Given this presumption, any restriction on interlinked 
contracts will have an adverse effect on welfare and efficiency.
However, it might be instructive to clarify how the presumed gains are distributed between the 
landlord and tenant. Interlinking can be thought of as shifting the utility possibility frontier of both 
tenant and landlord. Figure 3 shows the utility possibility frontier for the landlord and tenant before and 
after interlinking. The vertical axis measures the landlord’s income (which given risk neutrality is 
linearly related to his utility) and the horizontal axis measures the tenant’s welfare. The curve UU is the 
utility possibility frontier without interlinking and U ’U ’ is the utility possibility frontier with interlink­
ing. It lies farther out than UU because of the efficiency gains arising from less shirking, or a better 
allocation of risk, etc. Assume the initial allocation of welfare is given by point A. The question is, 
where will the new equilibrium allocation be with interlinking? A point like point B, which is an 
allocation that improves the welfare of both parties in the transaction, is possible. But points like C (in 
which the tenant loses from interlinking) or point D (in which the landlord loses from interlinking) are 
also possible. The idea that interlinking is welfare improving means that the utility possibility frontier 
is shifted out. -But it does not mean that the division of the benefits from interlinking accrues equitably 
to both parties or guarantees that no party loses from it.
Interlinking as a voluntary transaction in no way invalidates a point like C or D being achieved. 
The phenomenon being described here is analogous to the effects of technological change in agriculture 
which faces an inelastic demand for its product. It is rational for the individual farmer to want to increase 
income by innovating. But when all farmers adopt modern agricultural practices and become more pro-
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ductive, the resulting shift in the supply curve depresses food prices and lowers total farm income. Of 
course, if the individual farmer does not undertake to increase his productivity, the reduction in his 
income will be greater since the reduction in price is not offset by an increase in total output.
Banning interlinking is tantamount to shrinking the utility possibility frontier and will always 
involve a welfare loss for at least one party. Policymakers who are concerned with the monopoly power 
of landlords in these bilateral trades should be directed to find ways of redistributing the gains from 
interlinking instead of trying to outlaw the institution itself. Since interlinking involves a shift outward 
of the utility possibility frontier, it will always be possible, in principle, to redistribute the gains in such 
a way that no one ends up worse off. Such policies might involve the rehabilitation of rural banks, 
encouraging NGOs to compete as lenders or developing credit cooperatives in the rural areas. The ability 
of these institutions to generate loanable funds efficiently and respond to requirements of small farmers 
on a sustained basis remains an open question.
B. Land Reform
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) envisions a much wider application of land 
reform to include important crops like coconut and sugar left out in the land reform act of 1972. This 
is bound to rupture the traditional credit relationship between landlord and tenant. However, there is a 
general presumption in the tenancy-credit interlinking literature that land reform will result in an 
unambiguous increase in the share tenant’s welfare. This will occur even though the tenant might be
forced to seek credit at a price much higher than his landlord is willing to provide.
The Braverman-Srinivasan model is useful to work out the welfare analysis.8 Prior to land 
reform, assume the landlord is the cheaper source of credit (r, < ra) so that the tenant’s consumption and 
the landlord’s income are:
(5.1) C = Bf(ex)
(5.2) Y = (l-GP)f(ex)
where 6 =0C/(l+r() and 9 = 1 + rr The move to land reform can be decomposed into two steps -  the tenant 
must acquire his finance at the higher cost ra, and his share of the harvest fee) goes to one.
But with no restriction on the crop share, the landlord can always choose oC such that he attains 
his previous 6. That is, set it tooC’ =<£(l+ra)/(l+ rt). The tenant’s consumption is given by:
(5.3) C ’ = « ’/(l+ r )f(ex) = C
Now however, the second step impliescC.’ is adjusted towards unity which results in an unambiguous 
increase in consumption and hence welfare for the tenant.
8. It is important to note though the model proceeds from the absence of any uncertainty; hence, the unbundling of the linked 
contract as a result o f land reform is going to entail less cost to the tenant.
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This still leaves the central issue of where the credit needs of the new landowners are going to 
be met unresolved. A comparison with the land reform experience in rice might be misleading because 
land reform was accompanied by technological change. The increase in rice productivity allowed a 
natural linking of interest between rice farmers and traders. This is unlikely to be replicated in sugar and 
coconut, where productivity has been lagging for decades and no signs of significant progress are seen.
In principle, the new landowning class can become attractive to the formal financial sector since 
the newly-acquired lands can serve as collateral. This interest might be accentuated if the land reform 
program is accompanied by a support package including infrastructure and extension. This public 
investment might increase farmers’ expected incomes and reduce the risks of peasant agriculture and 
both factors should work to increase the market value of land.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize the design of land reform laws which must be 
subjected to intense economic scrutiny because no matter how well-meaning these might be, they may 
tend to produce quite unwelcome or unexpected consequences. This result emerges quite clearly in 
section four in a discussion of how restrictions on property rights to newly-acquired land have the effect 
of devaluing the market price of the transferred property.
The rationale for imposing these restrictions on resale has to do with preventing a return of land 
to previous owners. It might be argued that the reversion of land to the original owners and the resulting 
concentration of land ownership is socially undesirable. It is difficult to gauge how real these fears are. 
First of all, the original owners have undergone a capital loss in of the forced sale of their property to 
the state. Second, a land reform program accompanied by a package of support services provided by 
the state ought to increase the productivity of land and make it more attractive to keep. Finally, 
proponents of land reform have always argued the equity consideration is the most important objective. 
Whether the beneficiary then decides to keep the increase in wealth in the form of land, more human 
capital or financial assets should be irrelevant to the goal of moving towards a much fairer distribution 
of assets. Rates of return on other assets are possibly higher than in land, thus forcing these new owners 
to hold their windfall gain in the form of land which is not going to be pareto efficient. Even if the 
beneficiaries decide to resell to the original owners, this will not involve a return to the status quo ante 
since the former will be benefitted to the extent of the repurchase price of the land. If the new owners 
are to draw full advantage from the resuljts of the redistribution effort, property right restrictions ought 
to be done away with altogether.
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